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Appeal Number: 20040827-CA
Case Number: 030500244

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Tracy COWLEY,
Plaintiff, Appellee and CrossAppellant,

APPENDIX TO
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OPENING BRIEF OF CROSSAPPELLANT

V.

Slone PORTER.
Defendant, Appellant and
Cross-Appellee.

Jeffrey R. Price (#6315)
Christopher C.Hill (#9583)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.
139 E. South Temple, #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 961-7400
Facsimile: (801)961-7406

E. Craig Smay (#2985)
E. CRAIG SMAY, P.C.
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.: (801) 539-8515
Facsimile: (801) 539-8544

Attorney for Defendant, Appellant
And Cross-Appellee,

Attorney for Plaintiff Appellee
and Cross-Appellant.

KULKS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS, MEMORANDA, HEARINGS, ORDERS, OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDER
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an
answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to a
cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a
third-party complaint, if a person who was not an
original party is summoned under the provisions of
Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party
complaint is seized. No other pleading shall be
allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an
answer or a third-party answer.
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an
order shall be by motion which, unless made during a
hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this
rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly
and with particularity the relief sought and the
grounds for the relief sought.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Me mom it da retptired. exceptions,
filing
(tines. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte
motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion
and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the
motion shall tile a memorandum in opposition. Within
five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party may tile a reply memorandum,
which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in
the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda
will be considered without leave of court. A party may
attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed
10 pages of argument without leave of the court. Reply
memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument
without leave of the court. The court may permit a
party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex
parte application and a showing of good cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for
summary judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately
stated and numbered and supported by citation to
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for
summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of
additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any
dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials,
such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum,
each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as
affidavits or discovery materials.

(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of
argument shall contain a table of contents and a table
of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited in the
memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request to
Submit for Decision." The request to submit for
decision shall state the date on which the motion was
served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was
served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If
no party files a request, the motion will not hi*
submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any
motion. A party may request a hearing in the motion,
in a memorandum or in the request to submit for
decision. A request for hearing shall be separately
identified in the caption of the document containing the
request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing
on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would
dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the
action unless the court finds that the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has
been authoritatively decided,
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court,
including a minute order entered in writing, not
included in a judgment. An order for the payment of
money may be enforced in the same manner as if it
were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by
these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge
who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state
whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order
submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision,
sei-ve upon the other parties a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the
proposed order shall be filed within five days after
service. The party preparing the order shall file the
proposed order upon being served with an objection or
upon expiration of the time to object.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the
court. A party may object to the recommendation by
filing an objection in the same manner as C\\\ng a
motion within ten days after the recommendation is
made in open court or, if the court commissioner takes
the matter under advisement, ten clays after the
minute entry of the recommendation is served. A
party may respond to the objection in the same manner
as responding to a motion.

RULE 8. GENERAL RULES
OF PLEADINGS
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading' which sets forth
a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1)
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself
entitled. Relief in the alternative1 or of several different types may he demanded.
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall
state in short and plain terms his defenses to each
claim asseited and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this
has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the
substance of the averments denied. When a pleader
intends in good faith to deny only a part or a
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of
it as is true and material and shall deny only the
i'emainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to
controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading,
he may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny
all the averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does
so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so
by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in
Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively
accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration,
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow sen-ant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court
on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a
pleading to which a responsive pleading is required,
other than those.as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive
pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to He Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple,
concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or
motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of
a claim or defense alternately or hypothetic-ally, either
in one count or defense or in separate counts or

defenses. When two or more statements are made in
the alternative and one of them if made independently
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one ov more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as
many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless
of consistency and whether based on legal or on
equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be
made subject to the obligations set forth in Ride 11.
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice.

R U L E 12. D E F E N S E S AND O B J E C T I O N S
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by
statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an
answer within twenty days after the senice of the
summons and complaint is complete within the state
and within thirty days after sen'ice of the summons
and complaint is complete outside the state. A party
sei-ved with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve1
an answer thereto within twenty days after the service.
The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the
answer within twenty days after sen'ice of the answer
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty
days after sen'ice of the order, unless the order
othenvise directs. The senice of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a
different time is fixed by order of the court, but a
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a
pleading does not affect the time for responding to the
remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its
disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of
the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite
statement, the responsive pleading shall be served
within ten days after the senice of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (:]) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (o) insufficiency of service of process.
('(>) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A
motion making any of these defenses shall lie made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. So
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one
or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets

forth a claim for relief to which the adverse parly is not
required to ser\c j a responsive pleading, the adverse
party may assert at the trial any defense in law or l a d
to that claim for relief. If. on a motion asserting the
defense numbered (<>) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state4 a claim upon which relief can he
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall he
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of
as provided in Utile ~>b\ and all parties shall he given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule •">(;.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After
the pleadings are closed hut within such time as not t<>
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment <>n
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall he
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of
as provided in Rule •"><">, and all parties shall he given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule f>(i.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically
enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this ride,
whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of
this rule shall be hoard and determined before trial on
application of any party, unless the court orders that
the hearings and determination thereof be delerrerl
until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a
pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is
so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party
may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If
the motion is granted and the order of the* court is not
obeyed within ten days after notice of the order <>r
within such other time as the court may fix, the court
may strike the pleading to which the motion was
directed or make such order as if deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made
by a party within twenty days after the service of the
pleading, the court may order stricken from any
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
•(g) Consolidation of defenses. A parly who makes
a motion under this rule may join with it the other
motions herein provided for and then available. If a
party makes a motion under this rule and does not
include therein all flefenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion. lh<'
pally shall not thereafter make a motion based on any
of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.

(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses
and objections not presented either by motion or by
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and
the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings
or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any
evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of
a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion
made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a
waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff.
When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state,
or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for
costs and charges which may be awarded against such
plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court
of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall
order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with
sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs
and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the
plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within
30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon
motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the
action.

RULE 15. AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL
PLEADINGS

RULE 19. JOINDER OF PERSONS
NEEDED FOR JUST
ADJUDICATION

(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Othei-wise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to
an amended pleading within the time remaining for
response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever
period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise
orders.

(a) Persons to He Joined if Feasible. A person
who is subject to service of process and whose joinder
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be
made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a
propei* case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed
from the action.

(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on
the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of
the pleading sought .to be supplemented. Permission
may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the
adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it
shall so order, specifying the time therefor.

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder
Not Feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision
(a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience
the action should proceed among the parties before it,
or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedv if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) I'leading Reasons for Nonjoinder, A pleading
asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if
known to the pleader, of any persons as described in
Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and
the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is
subject to the provisions of Rule 23.

JefferyR.Price(6315)
Christopher C. Hill (9583)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.

One Thirty Nine East
South Temple St., Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)961-7400
Facsimile: (801) 961-7406
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter
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occurred by and among the Plainutts and Defendants between June 22, 2002 and July 19, 2002, Those
meetings and conversations concerned the dissolnln »n ol Advanced Maintenance Servu cs, \w
r'AMS'Y a I flah ( 'oiporalion, tl le distribution of assets from AM'S as between Slone Porter and Tracy
'"' ""'

U
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' " w 1 i l ,r f ' v? ' m n r , t ' n n nftho business n-ialion:,;,!;) netween Slone I ' O H L ' ••.*

Tracy Cowley.
[lie Complaint is a total of three (3) pat'ev and contains only nine (0) paragraphs r.; lacm.a
allegations and one cause of action ibi ,.iii...... i •<

n

'

nanuzraph ui the

n unipki'ii' no" dispuini I"1*, 'h 1 Hofendants, is paragraph 1 stating that the parties are each residents of
Wasatch County, Utah.
Paragraph i, ;aaLiu, • . : • • • . '

•. .
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te are owners of 50% of the stock of AMS,

and Paraj'.iaph v ^hrnm that Delendanls at> husband and wile aic owners of 50% of the ,^h.,,k .-: - •. i9
are false. Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley were each 50V o <>w nei »»i AMS

HnmfitfKn m ("owleyand

Deiendaiil Vaalynii IViifei wen never shareholders of AMS, and are not. individually, party to any
written agreement pertaining to AMS, its dissolution or the distribution ot a^ct., .:_> .aid between 1 ntc\
Cowley and Slone Porter
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--* a- agreement readied by and between Slone

Porter and Tracy Cowley as early as June 24, 2002 concerning the dissolution of AMS and the
distribution of it-: assets and the cessnfio-j . : ;.:.;. eusmov..
agr<^!- f ;
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[lie Court, having denied Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,

and thrice denying Plaintiffs' various motioiis for summary judgment, has determined -a. .
undisputed that Slonr I'oiiei and ! ncy i 'owlev fvadinl an agreement under which AMS was to be

dissolved, and the assets distributed by and In (\v< vn Ihc shwrhnUvTs, along with other assets not held in
lilt* iiiiiiK!" of AMS perse.
Paragraph 5 of the Complaint is falsi.:. \\ \ > uiuiispuu r. if.
new I lt;ih < Vt - • .-.
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MC illicii loiiii.'itioii >iiid npeiatinn n.| AMS in violation of the
7-Eleven, Inc. fired AM'S and Tracy Cowley from doing any further

" !-iue2-i ?H0? 7 Eleven, Inc. then re estaDiibi:.. i • «.t.i i* •
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'

and Veralynn Poilci in linn new company, only \hi (Is own purposes in keeping continuity of the service
work performed by the group of technicians whom 7-Eleven, Inc. needed to maintain its stores.
Following the decision of 7-hlcvcn, Inc. to diseonlinuc liny Imlli i u,niL M'HII AMS Ihc p irties met,
dr * us
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M M 1 •<! .i^eement pertaining to the dissolution of AMS and the distribution of its assets

between Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley. That agreement was rea.ch.ed orally o..

\

"< .•

not reduced In a wi ilniy signed In I u r v ("owicv ,iinf Slonr Porter.
As stated by the Court, pre oniiv before the court loi tri. ! ,nx essentially two issue0,' t I) u liether
the agreement between the parties call :* . :
*!• • • •
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* in the total

' ^ Mf ),000 or 5600,000 paid in monthly instalments over five years for Tracy Cowley's portion

ni \\\r • apital assets of AMS; and (?.) whether there has been :..i.h,.icnt pan pen* iin \u\nj\s . - iii -i .i!'u-. •-.
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: urcments of the Statute of Frauds, so that the

«

agreement is legally enforceable and binding.1
There appears to be no dispute concerning the other terms of the agreement, or that they have all
been completely performed. They included such things as Slone Porter being responsible for all of the
AMS debt; the payment of 50% of the cash on hand and the accounts receivable of AMS to Tracy
Cowley; transfer of 100% of the business of Straight Line Striping, Inc. to Mr. Cowley; transfer of his
choice of two properties purchased with funds of AMS; transfer of Mr. Cowley's vehicle from AMS to
him and payment of the outstanding balance of the loan on the truck; transfer of other vehicles to Mr.
Cowley; transfer of his IRA; transfer of key man life insurance policy; continuing payment of insurance
benefits for Mr. Cowley and his family; etc.
On the one hand, Defendants contend that the parties agreed that Cowleys would accept payment
of $240,000 for Tracy Cowley's portion of the AMS capital assets, to be paid in monthly instalments of
$4,000.00 over five years beginning in August 2002. The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000.00 per
month, every month since August 2002 in accordance with that Agreement and are not in breach of the
parties Agreement as of the date of the trial. Each of those payments has been received, accepted and
negotiated by the Cowleys.
The Plaintiffs contend, on the other hand, that Tracy Cowley accepted an initial offer from Slone
Porter to pay to Tracy Cowley $600,000 for Tracy Cowley's portion of the capital assets of AMS, to be
paid in monthly instalments of $10,000.00 over five years beginning in August 2002, and that the

By stipulation of the parties and order of the Court, the issues of whether to order
judicial dissolution, and the attendant valuation of the business of AMS have been bifurcated and
reserved for trial later, if, and only if the court determines the agreement of the parties is not
enforceable by reason of the Statute of Frauds.

payment of $4,000.00 is nothing but a subsistence stipend of some sort, for which Slone Porter is not
entitled to a credit against the $600,000.00. There is no admissible evidence to support the Plaintiffs'
contention that Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter reached an Agreement, oral or in writing, for payment of
the $600,000.00. Both the conduct and direct testimony of the Plaintiffs contradict their newly contrived
theory of recovery in this case.
The overwhelming weight of the competent, relevant and admissible evidence is that because of
the termination of AMS by 7-Eleven, Inc. stemming from the violation of the customer's CBC by Tracy
Cowley and Slone Porter, and the customer's insistence that Tracy Cowley could have no business with
7-Eleven, Inc. through AMS or otherwise, and that AMS contracts were to be re-bid and QMS would
have to establish itself as a new vendor, Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter reached an agreement on July
19, 2002, for payment of the $240,000, based upon Tracy Cowley's own inventory and valuation of the
capital assets of AMS. The agreement of the parties was always premised upon the ability of Slone
Porter to maintain work and obtain revenue from the customer, 7-Eleven, Inc.
Thereafter, the parties proceeded according to their agreement until Tracy Cowley has sought to
obtain more money from the Porters by threat of disclosure of private facts, and this litigation. Because
of the violation of the CBC by Slone and Tracy Cowley, and directly and proximately because of Tracy
Cowley's attempt through this lawsuit to continue to profit from the violation, the customer, 7-Eleven,
Inc. has completely terminated its relationship with QMS and Slone and Veralynn Porter, so that there is
no more business after May 31, 2004.
Under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs are entitled to no recovery or relief under the
Complaint. First, Veralynn Porter is not an appropriate defendant under the circumstances of this case.

Second, there has been no breach of the parties' Agreement by Slone Porter. The Court has no authority
at law to issue a judgment against Slone Porter or any defendant based upon concerns about a potential
future breach of contract. Finally, this action and the resulting loss of Slone Porter's business with 7Eleven, Inc. were directly and proximately caused by Tracy Cowley, such that he is estopped from
recovery of any damages from Slone Porter under the doctrines of failure to mitigate damages, waiver,
estoppel, and unclean hands.
ARGUMENT
I.

CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
The Cowleys' Complaint alleges that Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. ("AMS) was

improperly dissolved. There are three different procedures by which a corporation may be dissolved
under the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act. They are: (1) voluntarily dissolution under § 16- 10a1401 et seq., (2) administrative dissolution under §16-10a-1420 and 1421; and (3) judicial dissolution
under §16-10a-1430 and 1431. The claim for Judicial Dissolution is moot, and reserved for trial later
only upon the court's determination in this bifurcated proceeding that the parties reached an oral
agreement which is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
II.

CONTRACT
"In order to support a contract there must be an offer and an acceptance, together with a

consideration." Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir. 1971). The offer and acceptance
elements of contract formation constitute mutual assent. In order for an agreement to be enforced, there
must be mutual assent. "cIt is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are

indefinite.'" Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600, 602 (Utah 2003) (quoting Richard Barton Enters, v.
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted)). Any agreement which was entered into
between two parties must contain all of the material terms of the agreement.
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that:
"It is not necessary that the contract itself contain all the particulars of the agreement.
The crucial question is whether the parties agreed on the essential terms of the contract."
Stated another way, a contract does not exist without a "meeting of the minds" or "mutual
assent." Regarding this requirement, "the intentions of the parties to a contract are
controlling, and generally those intentions will be found in the instrument itself.
However, if a writing is not sufficient to establish meaning, resort may be had to
extraneous evidence manifesting the intentions of the parties."
C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah Ct. App. (1995) (citations omitted)).
In this case, there was never an agreement for payment of $10,000.00 per month to the Cowleys.
There was never mutual assent to such an agreement. This was offered \o the Cowleys, but never
accepted. Tracy Cowley returned his copy of the written offer without signing it to the Porters with a
notation on it for Ms. Porter to call him. She did call him and they discussed additional terms he wanted
in the contract. These additional terms constitute a counteroffer by the Cowleys. "So long as there is
any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be had between the parties,
there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no contract at all." 67 Utah 605, 608 (Utah 1926).
"' A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept it, which adds qualifications or requires
performance of conditions is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer.'" Wadsworth Const, v. City of St.
George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting R.J. Damn Const, v. Child, 247 P.2d 817,
821 (Utah 1952)). The response by Mr. Cowley contacting the Porters and discussing additional terms
constitutes a counteroffer.

u

0n the other hand, a response is an acceptance where the offeree manifests 'unconditional

agreement to all of the terms of the offer.' The offeree must 'manifest a definite intention to accept the
offer and every part thereof. .. without material reservations or conditions." Id. (quoting R.J. Daum
Co«^.,247P.2dat819).
It is clear that there was never a meeting of the minds between the Cowleys and the Porters in
this matter on the $10,000.00 per month payment. The Cowleys came back to the Porters to discuss
additional terms which constitute a counteroffer. This counteroffer was never accepted by the Porters.
There was no meeting of the minds between the parties on a contract for $10,000.00 per month for five
years.
III.

BREACH OF CONTRACT
Utah law is clear on what is necessary to prove a breach of contract claim. "The elements of a

prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery,
(3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry,
38 P.2d 984, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, f 14).
In the present case, the Cowleys cannot prove that a breach of a contract has occurred. A
contract did exist, and the Porters have adhered to that contract since the split between the Porters and
the Cowleys happened. The Cowleys have argued that the terms of the contract are different than the
terms the Porters have adhered to. This issue as to what the terms of the contract are is to be determined
at this trial.
The Cowleys did in fact turn over all of the assets of AMS to the Porters, and the Porters, in turn,
did perform all terms of the contract agreed to. The Cowleys cannot prove that the Porters have

breached any contract because they have not. The Cowleys' counsel in open court admitted that the
Porters have not been delinquent or missed any payment to the Cowleys. There has been no breach of
the agreement. The Cowleys have not suffered any damages because there has been no breach by the
Porters.
The Cowleys cannot prove their claim for breach of contract because the Porters have met all of
the terms and conditions of the contract, there has been no breach of the contract, and the Cowleys have
not suffered any damages as a result of any breach because there has been none.
IV.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The Statute of Frauds is generally found at Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1, et seq., and requires certain

types of agreement to be executed in writing. The Statute includes agreements regarding interests in real
estate, as well as agreements which cannot be performed within one year. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1, 4(1)
The Utah Supreme Court has long established that "the doctrine of part performance allows a
court of equity to enforce an oral agreement, if it has been partially performed, notwithstanding the
statute of frauds." Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002) (citing Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274,
275 (Utah 1983)).
The Utah Supreme Court in Spears, concerning the standard for determining sufficient partial
performance, stated in pertinent part:
The standard for sufficient partial performance in Utah is as follows:
[1] the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; [2] the acts done in
performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts must be in
reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they would not have
been performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of
the promisor would result in fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be
inadequate. Reliance may be made in innumerable ways, all of which could refer
exclusively to the contract

Id. (quoting Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983)).
Acts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract in that the
possession of the party seeking specific performance and the improvements made by him
must be reasonably explicable only on the postulate that a contract exists. The reason for
such requirement is that the equitable doctrine of part performance is based on estoppel
and unless the acts of part performance are exclusively referable to the contract, there is
nothing to show that the plaintiff relied on it or changed his position to his prejudice.
Id. at 751 (quoting Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah 1983)).
In another cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court, the Court discussed the part performance
exception to the statute of frauds. The Court stated:
As we have held with regard to the statute of frauds:
'The critical observation to make in [assessing] what constitutes sufficient
part performance is that it must be proved by strong evidence. Whether
phrased in "reliance" terminology where the evidentiary measurement is a
substantial changed in position or worded in "performance" language where
the measurement is whether the acts appear to be a result of the contract, or
whether they are explainable on another ground, the strong, acts-oriented
evidentiary standard is constant." Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275
(Utah 1983); see also 2 Corbin on Contracts, § 425 (1950). Merely
preparatory acts,.. .do not constitute part performance. See e.g., Baugh v.
Logan City, 495 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1972).
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801-02 (Utah 1998).
By the overwhelming weight of the evidence in this case, from both the conduct of the parties, the
documentation relating to the facts and circumstances of the parties' discussions, and the testimony of the
witnesses, including the Plaintiffs, there was no agreement concerning payment of the $600,000.00.
There was a completed oral agreement for payment of the $240,000.00, together with the distribution of
the other assets and consideration of Slone Porter being responsible for the debt of AMS. There can be
no genuine dispute that sufficient part performance has occurred to bring the parties' agreement squarely
within the exception to the Statute of Frauds and is legally binding and enforceable. There has been no

breach of the Agreement by Slone Porter. Under these circumstances judgment should be for the
Defendants, and the Complaint dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.
V.

MITIGATION
The Cowleys' claims are barred by reason that Tracy Cowley has failed to mitigate any damages

he alleges he has incurred relating to the parties' agreement. Concerning the Plaintiffs' requirement to
mitigate damages, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Damages awarded for breach of contract should 'place the nonbreaching party in as good
a position as if the contract had been performed.'" Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St.
Benedicts Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994) (quoting Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d
692, 695 (Utah 1982)). However, under the doctrine of avoidable consequences the
nonbreaching party has an active duty to mitigate his damages, and he "may not, either by
action or inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach." Utah Farm Prod.
Credit Ass 'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981); Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 611
P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983); see also Anesthesiologists Assoc v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 852
P.2d 1030, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); John CallEng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1981).
Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 940 (Utah 1999).
The Utah Court of Appeals has described mitigation in the following way:
In an action for damages for breach of contract, the amount of damages otherwise recoverable by
plaintiff can be reduced if plaintiff succeeded in mitigating its damages or if it failed to properly
mitigate its damages. "The doctrine of of avoidable consequences, also referred to as mitigation
of damages, generally operates to prevent ono against whom a wrong has been committed from
recovering any item of damage arising from the wrongful conduct which could have been avoided
or minimized by reasonable means." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah
1983). However, the burden of proving plaintiff has not mitigated its damages and that its award
should be correspondingly reduced is on defendant. "The plaintiff has the burden of showing the
contract breach and his damages, while, as a rule the defendant has the burden of proving that
damages shown could have been minimized." D. Dobbs, Remedies § 12.6, at 830 (1973).

In order to submit the issue [of mitigation] to the jury, there must be competent evidence to show
that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages." Barnes v. Lopez, 544
P.2d 694, 698 (Ariz. App. 1976).
John CallEng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In the present case, the Cowleys have done nothing to mitigate their damages, if any. On the
contrary, they, by their actions in this lawsuit and in choosing to violate the 7-Eleven, Inc. CBC have
directly and proximately caused the circumstances which may impair their ability to obtain any further
payment under the parties' agreement such that their claim is barred as a matter of law. They have
continued to harass the Porters in their business efforts, and have continued such techniques to the point
that the Porters' sole customer, 7-Eleven, Inc., for their new business, QMS, has terminated all contracts
with QMS because of the Cowleys. The Cowleys cannot and should not now be heard to complain that
they are still owed money based on the valuation of a business which was destroyed by their own actions.
VI.

WAIVER
The Utah Supreme Court has stated what is necessary for the doctrine of waiver to apply. The

Court stated; "With respect to the doctrine of waiver, this Court has stated: 'To constitute waiver, one's
action or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive,
and must be inconsistent with any other intent.'" Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 776-77
(Utah 1983) (quoting Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983)).
In this case, the Cowleys have waived any claim that they may have for $10,000.00 per month by
their actions. The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000.00 per month for twenty-two months with the
Cowleys accepting each and every payment. There was never any agreement to pay $10,000.00 per
month and this is evidenced by the conduct of both parties. There can be no other reason for the

acceptance of the $4,000.00 per month payments other than that is what was agreed to by both parties.
Twenty-two (22) months of payments and acceptance certainly cannot be interpreted to be "temporary
subsistence" payments.
VII.

ESTOPPEL
The Utah Supreme Court has stated what is necessary for the doctrine of estoppel to apply. The

Court stated:

The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his acts, representations, or conduct,
or by his silence when he ought to speak, induces another to believe certain facts exist and
such other relies thereon to his detriment.
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (quoting Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d
1262, 1264 (Utah 1980)).
The Court further stated that "the purpose of the doctrine of estoppel is 'to rescue from loss a
party who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another.'"
Id. (quoting Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners' Association 656 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1982)).
In a separate case, the Utah Supreme Court set out the elements necessary to bring the doctrine of
estoppel into play. The Court stated:
The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel are:
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted,
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such admission, statement, or act.
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979).
In this case, the Cowleys have made admissions, statements, and/or acts inconsistent with their
claims, specifically, they have been accepting $4,000.00 payments every month from the Porters for

nearly two years. This is inconsistent from their claim that they are owed $10,000.00 per month. The
Porters have acted in good faith in reliance on the agreement with the Cowleys for $4,000.00 per month
and the fact the Cowleys have been accepting this amount for twenty-two (22) months. The Porters have
suffered devastating financial loss stemming from the loss of the their business, caused by the Cowleys
actions and conduct. Under the doctrine of estoppel, the Cowleys' claims are barred such that the Court
should enter judgment for the Defendants excusing any further performance under the Agreement, and to
dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.
VIII. UNCLEAN HANDS
"The equitable doctrine of clean hands expresses the principle that where a party comes into
equity for relief he or she must show that his or her conduct has been fair, equitable, and honest as to the
particular controversy in issue. A complainant will not be permitted to take advantage of his or her own
wrong or claim the benefit of his or her own fraud or that of his or her privies." 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity
§ 126 (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated regarding unclean hands, "the 'unclean hands' doctrine
'closes the door of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter
in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant."' ABF Freight
System, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 510 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1994) (quoting Precision
Instrument Mfg. co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945)).
One of the fundamental principles found in equity is that '"he who seeks equity must come into
the court with clean hands.'" Hocker v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 922 F. 2d 1476, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Lewis v. State Bd. of Control, 699 P.2d 822, 827 (Wyo. 1985)). It does not matter if both parties
come to court with unclean hands, the "defendant holds the stronger ground." Bruner v. Bruner, 338 F.3d

1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "The clean-hands doctrine bars Plaintiffs claims
notwithstanding the fact that those who stand to benefit from the doctrine's use,..., also participated in
the alleged fraud." Id.
In this case the Cowleys come into this case with unclean hands. Mr. Cowley was violating the 7Eleven CBC the entire time AMS was in business. This violation of the CBC, as well as this litigation
has caused QMS to be terminated by 7-Eleven, all because of the unclean hands of the Cowleys. Under
the doctrine of unclean hands, the Cowleys' claims are barred such that the Court should enter judgment
for the Defendants excusing any further performance under the Agreement, and to dismiss the Complaint
in its entirety, with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, and in light of the evidence adduced at the
trial, Defendants Slone and Veralynn Porter request that the Court issue and Order and Judgment in their
favor and against Plaintiffs Tracy and Kerin Cowley, to excuse Slone Porter from any further
performance by way of payment to the Cowleys, and to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with
prejudice, and to award to Defendants all further relief the Court deems just and appropriate under the
circumstances.
DATED this

day of May, 2004.
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C

Jeffery R. Price
Christopher C. Hill
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^ ^ c l a y of May, 2004,1 caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing TRIAL BRIEF upon counsel for Plaintiffs by hand delivery to the following:
E. Craig Smay
Attorney at Law
174 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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agreement or not and if so was enforceable.
No objection by Mr. Smay, granted by the Court.
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a 1st place setting on October 4-5, 2004.
Relevent discovery argued by counsel.
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Mr. Price to submit an appropriate order and submit it to the
Court for signature and filing.
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Facsimile: (801) 961-7406
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter

m THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
m AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY

TRACY COWLEY,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 030500244
SLONE PORTER,
Judge Donald Eyre, Jr.
Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court during the trial on June 1 and June 2, 2004 in this
matter, and based upon Defendant's Counsel's oral motion dismiss both Plaintiff, Kerin Cowley and
Defendant, Veralynn Porter as parties in this lawsuit, the Court having heard oral argument from both
parties and having reviewed the pleadings on file now rules as follows:

Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff, Kerin Cowley and Defendant, Veralynn Porter as Parties
is hereby granted.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court will grant the oral
motion argued by both parties and will dismiss Kerin Cowley, plaintiff and Veralynn Porter, defendant
as parties to this lawsuit
DATED this

?f day of. j.

2004.

OURT

3ge Donalq
Judge

Approved as to form:

E. Craig Smay
Attorney for Defendant (s)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this c 7 - > o a y of June, 2004,1 caused to be served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order upon counsel for Plaintiffs via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid to the following:
E. Craig Smay
Attorney at Law
174 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TRACY and KERIN COWLEY

AFFIDAVIT OF KERIN COWLEY

Plaintiffs,

abfiwwy

v.

Case Number:.©©?955?^4
SLONE and VERALYNN PORTER
Judge Donald J. Eyre
Defendants.

Kerin Cowley, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am the Kerin Cowley who appeared and testified as a plaintiff herein.
2. October 4, 2004, I attended a meeting at the office of E. Craig Smay and heard the
testimony, under oath, of Slone Porter regarding payment of the Judgment in this matter.
3. Mr. Porter testified in my presence as follows:
a. He has not paid any part of, and has no plan to pay, the Judgment:
b. Prior to the trial herein, he conveyed his half-interest in Quality Maintenance
Services ("QMS") to Vera Lynn Porter, the owner of the other half, for $1.00;
c. He in fact testified at trial herein that he is an "owner" of TruGreen Land Care of
Utah, ("TLCU") but is now merely a forty hour per week, $250/week employee of TLCU; he is not
1

now an owner of TLCU;
d. TLCU is a franchise, which was purchased with proceeds of a Zion's Bank loan
in the original principal amount of $609,000 made in February 2004, and that such loan also
provides a continuing line of credit for operations of TLCU.
e. Mr. Porter is the obligor on such Zion's Bank Loan; if there are other obligors;
Mr. Porter cannot identify them;
f. Mr. Porter cannot identify who purchased TLCU with the proceeds of the Zion's
Bank loan on which Mr. Porter is obligor;
g. One of the services Mr. Porter provides TLCU for his salary of + $6.25/hr. is to
provide it his contractor's license as a basis for its operations;
h. When the Court, shortly prior to trial herein, lifted an attachment of real estate
belonging to Mr. Porter and his wife, the properties were immediately sold, for $254,000 and
$110,000 respectively, and the proceeds paid to retire said Zion's Bank Loan;
i. No assets of QMS were transferred to TLCU; Mr. Porter does not know what
disposition was made of the assets of QMS;
J. Mr. Porter's "supervisor" at TLCU is Brian Curtis; and
k. Mr. Porter has no other interest of any kind in any business entity.
4. I took careful notes of the questions asked Mr. Porter, and the answers he gave and have
reviewed them carefully in making this affidavit, and the foregoing is a true and correct account of
his testimony.
5. I am personally aware of the delivery of assets of QMS to TLCU, as my husband, Tracy
Cowley and I, shortly before the trial herein, observed the majority of the vehicles belonging to

2

QMS, and so identified by painted logos, parked in the equipment lot of TLCU, and photographed
them there.
6. Following the trial herein, my husband and I have received no payment of any kind from
Mr. Porter or QMS.
Further Affiant sayeth not.

DATED this

V - day of October, 2004.

Kerin Cowley

.County of y u * * ^ - ^
State ot J^J^
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Notary Public
^ ^
State of Utah
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Commission Expires July 31 2007
P 0 Box 38. 5 South Mam. Hebet City. UT 84032

(Notary&Snature)
:ippW€hristensen

My
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E. Craig Smay #2985
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515
Fax Number (801) 539-8544

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY

Tracy and Kerin COWLEY,
PLAINTIFFS' POST TRIAL MEMO
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case Number: 030500244
Slone and Veralynn PORTER.
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr.
Defendants.

PlaintifFs submit herewith their Post-Trial Memorandum, accompanying proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
DISPOSITION AFTER TRIAL
The Court may well wonder at this point why plaintiffs have bothered to put on evidence of
a $600,000 buy-out of plaintiff s half of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. ("AMS"). Certainly,
based upon even the scant financial evidence in the matter, a half-interest in AMS as of June 22, 2002
was worth vastly more than $600,000 over five years without interest. Moreover, there has never
been a serious prospect in this case that defendants could show an agreement to accept $4,000/month
for five years, or that any such "agreement" was "partially performed" sufficiently to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, or that any such "agreement" was adequately supported by consideration, or not
vitiated by fraud or duress. Plaintiffs' interests were served by persisting in a claim for judicial
dissolution.
The reason, however self-congratulatory it might sound, is that the Court is entitled to the
truth, and plaintiffs under an obligation to provide it. Once discovery placed the pertinent evidence

in plaintiffs' hands, the only proper course was to put it into proper context for the Court. Further,
of course, unless all of the available evidence is treated truthfully and in context, the result can only
be dishonest and misleading, as pointedly demonstrated in this matter by the first Affidavit of Slone
Porter.
Finally, that plaintiffs have fully explicated the facts, and that the facts may show a contract
to sell their interest in AMS for $600,000, does not bind them now to affirm such a contract, and
forego a judicial dissolution. Any such agreement may have been procured by defendants' breach of
a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Moreover, where a contract has been repeatedly and
deliberately breached despite repeated requests for compliance, it may be cancelled, and return of the
subject matter demanded. Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 1979). As defendants
now assert that they have despoiled the subject matter, and lost its value, the corollary rule is that
they must pay its value (as of June 22, 2002). This is not affected by a claim that there can be no
judicial dissolution because AMS has already been dissolved: the only "dissolution" in evidence is the
void one filed July 21, 2002, which defendants claim to have based upon a non-existent agreement
of July 19, 2002. In short, the real agreement of the parties to dissolve AMS being shown, it is also
shown that defendants' behavior constituted fraud and duress, and has constituted continuing,
material breach. Plaintiffs may now opt to rescind such agreement, and insist upon a judicial
valuation and dissolution.
Where defendants force plaintiffs to a trial demonstrating both such contract and its deliberate,
long-term breach, they should not expect that plaintiffs will affirm the contract as they might have
done had defendants behaved honestly. Defendants' disavowal of plaintiffs' affirmance of such
contract on summary judgment frees plaintiff to assert rescission now.

ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR DECISION
There are a number of possible alternative bases for decision in this matter as follows:
1. A contract for $600,000 which the parties agreed was made at least orally, and written and
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signed by at least Slone Porter, on June 24, 2002;
2. A contract for $600,000 on June 24, 2002, because the signing by Porter of Cowley's
written counteroffer created a contract without Cowley's signature.
3. A contract for $600,000 completed by June 29, 2002, because Cowieys' full performance
by that date substituted for his signature.
4. A contract for $600,000 demonstrated by "part performance" referable only to that
agreement.
5. An alleged July 19, 2002, $240,000 "contract" after the fact, as to which there is no
undisputed evidence of agreement.
6. A claim that such $240,000 "contract" was "partially performed" for purposes of the
Statute of Frauds by three subsequently disputed payments.
7. Unenforceability of such alleged $240,000 contract because the consideration to support
it and the inducement to plaintiffs to enter into it, claimed sudden decline in the value of the subject
matter, was false and fraudulent.
8. Unenforceability of such $240,000 "contract" because it was extorted under duress by the
breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
9. Non-existence of either a $600,000 contract or a $240,000 contract, necessitating a
judicial dissolution.
10. Non-existence of a $240,000 contract and rescission of a $600,000 contract as procured
by fraud or duress or for repeated breach, necessitating a judicial dissolution.
Since the many prospects contain only one which could benefit defendants, it is appropriate
to deal with that first. Defendants can succeed only if the Court were to find, by clear and convincing
evidence producing a strong conviction, that plaintiffs on July 19, 2002, voluntarily and informedly
agreed to accept $4,000/month for five years for their half of AMS, and that there then transpired
substantial acts in compliance with such agreement which can only be explained by the existence of
such a contract. (Cites)
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It is essential to defendants' case to demonstrate that what Mr. Porter accurately described
as "our buy-out agreement" of June 24, 2002, was effectively withdrawn before July 19, 2002.
Otherwise, all of the acts of "performance" which defendants have cited as "part performance" of
a July 19th contract are referable instead to "our buy-out agreement" of June 24, 2002. That would
doom any claim of "strict referability" to the alleged agreement of July 19, 2002. Mr. Porter now
asserts what Mrs. Porter and Mr. Cowley deny, and which was omitted from his encyclopedic
affidavits: that on June 26, 2002, Porter unilaterally withdrew "our buy-out agreement" of June 24,
2002.
If the document signed by Porter the morning ofJune 24,2002, satisfies the Statute of Frauds,
or if the signature constituted acceptance of a counter-offer creating a contract, nothing Porter now
claims to have said on June 26,2002, could withdraw or condition the agreement. Nothing said later
on July 19, 2002, could withdraw or condition the prior agreement. S.C.M. Land Co. v. Watkins &
Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1986).
Supposing that the signed writing of June 24th does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Porter's
testimony about June 26th is as incredible as it is ineffective to avoid a claim of part performance of
the June 24th agreement.
The June 26th story, omitted from Porter's encyclopedia affidavit of September 29, 2003,
contradicts the testimony of Mrs. Porter and Mr. Cowley that nothing happened between June 24th
and July 19th to alter the agreement, as well as the testimony of both Porters and Mr. Cowley that on
June 27, 2002, all three told Mr. de Besche of 7-Eleven that a deal had been concluded to buy out
Mr. Cowley's interest. That discussion, according to the notes made at the time, included the Porters
discussing the terms with de Besche in such a way that he must actually have seen the document,1 but

1

Mr. Cowley is said to have sought a change in "number 9". This remark signifies
nothing unless de Besche had the document before him and could see that the ninth item, which is
otherwise un-numbered, is the "no non-compete clause", and not one of the other numbered
provisions. The reference to withdrawing the offer on "Monday" is clearly to June 24th whereupon, they put "everything in the paper" to make an agreement. By its terms, it does not
refer to June 26th.
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contains no claim that on the preceding Wednesday the agreement had been withdrawn.
The story about June 26th, which Mr. Porter "could not wait" to tell, is simply an eleventh
hour fabrication to plug a growing hole in defendants' position. Even if believed, it fails because
Porter then testified that on June 26, 2002 the Cowleys "exploded" and rejected any change.
Thereafter, Cowleysfollyperformed and Porters partially performed, all without objection. Porter's
acceptance of Cowley's performance knowing of Cowleys' reliance upon the agreement of June 24th
is decisive. Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (U. Apps. 1993); R.J. Daum Const.
Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 819-20 (Utah 1952); Walters v. Natl Beverage Co., 402 P.2d 524, 525
(Utah 1967).

AMS WAS NEVER "FIRED"
Central to the defense is the claim that on June 24, 2002, AMS was "fired" by 7-Eleven,
leaving an empty, worthless shell for which Porters should not have to pay much. The claim has no
substance.
Porter concedes that on the morning of June 24, 2002, he and Cowley made a "buy-out
agreement". It is admitted that on the afternoon of June 24, 2002, Cowley called Ann Atkin and was
told that as 7-Eleven would not do business with a company associated with Cowley, Straight Line
Striping ("SLS") could no longer work for 7-Eleven, and that Cowley conveyed this information to
Porter (who had assured him to the contrary). As Cowley had told Atkin he would no longer be
associated with AMS, Atkin did not tell Cowley that AMS could no longer work for 7-Eleven, and
Cowley did not tell Porter.
Mrs. Porter then called Atkin. Porter claims that she was told that no company associated
with Mr. Cowley could thereafter work for 7-Eleven, and that, if the Porters wished to retain this
work, they should promptly form a new company. Mrs. Porter told Mr. Porter. They promptly
formed Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("QMS") to carry on for AMS. Thus, according to Slone
Porter, AMS was "fired" by 7-Eleven. In fact, since Cowley had agreed to leave AMS, all that
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occurred is that Porters changed the company's name. Everything else remained the same.
Since Cowley had already agreed to leave 7-Eleven, it is obvious that no real "firing" of AMS
ever occurred.

Porters would not have incorporated QMS had they believed 7-Eleven would not

deal with AMS following Mr. Cowley's departure. What was said on the evening of June 24th
provides no excuse for attempting to cancel the agreement reached the morning of June 24th. Further,
Porters learned at the same time that any real decision about the future of the company first named
AMS would not be made until June 27th, by Johan de Besche, not Ann Atkin.
Nothing occurred on June 24th or June 27th which constituted the "firing" of AMS or its
successor QMS, or which ultimately diminished in any way what Porters agreed to buy on June 24th.
At most, on June 27, 2002, the basis on which QMS was paid for the work previously done for 7Eleven by AMS was temporarily changed. This admittedly was done while 7-Eleven investigated the
involvement of the Porters in the defalcations of which they had accused Mr. Cowley. No such
defalcations were ever found. As the Porters must have known at all times that their accusations of
Cowley were false, they could never have been much concerned about the investigation. That 7Eleven required prior contracts to be re-bid in the Fall simply exercised a right which 7-Eleven had
in any case. As discussed below, this could not have concerned the Porters either.

PORTERS MAY NOT DEMAND A SIGNATURE THEY PREVENTED
The Court's declaration at the end of trial that had the "buy-out" document signed by Slone
Porter on June 24, 2002, then been signed by Tracy Cowley, the Court would enforce it without
reservation, may place too great a stress on the necessity for Mr. Cowley's signature.
It must be remembered that from June 24th onward, the Porters had the document. Mr.
Cowley had indicated his willingness to sign when Mrs. Cowley returned, apparently on June 27lh.
The notes of discussions June 27th with Mr. de Besche clearly affirm this, despite Porter's present
denials. A phone call between Cowleys and Mrs. Porter on June 24th about the "no non-compete
clause" changed nothing. The Porters could have obtained a signature at any time thereafter - but
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Mr. Cowley could not affix one without the Porter's cooperation. By then, Porters had begun to
imagine they could force a better deal. They never made the document available again.
In the circumstances, the significance of a lack of Mr. Cowley's signature was not the ordinary
one of lack of agreement. The signature became a mere formality prevented by the Porters. The
Porters' behavior erases any meaning the failure of Mr. Cowley to affix a signature could have had.
Where Cowley was not provided opportunity to sign, the Court should accord decisive
significance to the fact that Mr. Cowley promptly, fully performed. There being no other means of
signifying consent, the purport of full performance should not be diminished by failure to also affix
a signature.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The document signed by Slone Porter the morning of June 24, 2002, constituted Cowleys'
counteroffer for the sale of Cowleys' half interest in AMS. Setting aside whether it was procured by
duress, an acceptance which adds to or varies the terms constitutes a counteroffer. Cal Wadsworth
Construction v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 13 72,13 78 (Utah 1995). It is agreed that Cowley added
terms to Porters' initial offer, and had Veralynn Porter type them for execution. It is also agreed that
the parties were then informed and understood that the terms as typed were terms acceptable to
Cowley.
Porter's signature on a document constituting a written counteroffer created a contract. Id.
While there is evidence of a brief discussion thereafter of changing a term sought by Cowley, the legal
fact is that (excepting duress) Cowley was then bound. In any case, no change was made. The
document as signed by Porter satisfies the Statute of Frauds. Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton,
supra; LeVine v. Whitehouse, 109 Pac 2, 5-6 (Utah 1910). It could not thereafter be changed except
by a further signed writing. S.CM. Land Co. v. Watkins &Faber, supra.
Whatever technical defects might be alleged in this writing, the facts surrounding it are clear
and convincing evidence of an agreement. All of the events of "performance" which transpired
thereafter, including the $4,000/month payments after July 19, 2002, are referable to this agreement,
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since there is no clear and convincing evidence of any other agreement. E.g., Martin v. Scholl, 678
P.2d 274 (Utah 1983); Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d. 743, 751 (Utah 2002); In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d
278, 281 (Utah 1994). Having procured, by this agreement, full performance by the Cowleys, the
Porters are not permitted to avoid their obligations by unilaterally asserting a subsequent, cheaper
agreement. Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, supra. The latter is precisely the kind of fraud the
Statute of Frauds aims to prevent.
In short, to the extent the Statute of Frauds is applicable in this case, it does not prevent
enforcement of a $600,000 "buy-out" agreement, while excluding the Porters' claims of a $240,000
agreement.

"TOSSED IN THE JORDANELLE"
The Porters concede that they tape recorded the meetings of the parties on June 22nd and June
24, 2002. They concede that on June 24th, Tracy Cowley told them he accepted their original offer
of June 22nd with some changes. They assert that Cowley then told them what changes he would
accept. Cowley insisted upon a writing, which Slone Porter signed.
Nevertheless, they say, on July 19, 2002, they reached a new agreement. Oddly, the Porters,
though they say that the purpose of the meeting was to form a new agreement, did not record it.
Cowley, who had insisted upon a writing before, is said to not have on July 19th. Then, says Mrs.
Porter, on July 24th, at a Statehood Day celebration on the Jordanelle, she tossed in the tape
recordings; they were no longer needed, in view of the oral agreement reached July 19th. Meanwhile,
the Porters had the only copy of the June 24th document signed by Slone Porter.
It seems plain that Mrs. Porter's story about July 24th was simply a lie to cover an
embarrassment: she had already testified that she never complied with promises to provide the tapes
to the Cowleys because the tapes had been destroyed before July 19, 2002. The purport of the story
had it been true, however, cannot be ignored. Asserting the validity of an alleged "oral agreement"
of which there was no undisputed proof, the Porters knowingly destroyed the undisputable evidence
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of an earlier contrary oral agreement, while withholding a writing evidencing the earlier agreement.
This behavior made it possible for defendants to claim, in a subsequent letter from their
counsel to plaintiffs' counsel, that the alleged oral agreement to accept $240,000 for plaintiffs' half
of AMS, had transpired on June 22, 2002. Plaintiffs, defendants and their counsel must have thought,
had no undisputed proof of the real events of June 22-24, and if defendants got away with a claim of
oral agreement on June 22, they could claim that everything that occurred thereafter was "part
performance" under the Statute of Frauds of the alleged $240,000 agreement, while avoiding a claim
that their behavior June 23-27 constituted coercion.
Fortuitously, and unknown to defendants, when the letter to counsel was written, Mr. Cowley
had retained the handwritten note of the agreement of June 24, 2002. While unsigned, the document
rendered untenable the story told by Slone Porter in his first Affidavit, and prompted the convoluted
tale told by the Porters in their Affidavits of September 29, 2003.

ANNATKIN
Defendants subpoenaed, to testify at trial, Ann Atkin of 7-Eleven, the author of at least two
extraordinarily accusatory affidavits in this matter. Ms. Atkin reached the courthouse on June 2,
2004, but was then sent home without testifying.
No doubt, that was because Veralynn Porter had confessed on the stand that promptly upon
Mr. Cowley's departure from AMS at the end of June 2002, the Porters, having re-incorporated AMS
as QMS, began making payments to Ms. Atkin, Mr. Cowley's replacement at 7-Eleven. This was
done by making Ms. Atkin's "life partner", Kim Ashton, and her company, Open to the Possibilities,
a supplier to 7-Eleven through QMS.2 Mrs. Porter did not dispute that the sum of these payments
through 2003 may have been $50,000, though she thought, without particulars, "that might be a little

The possibility exists that Ms. Atkin was similarly paid between the time Mr. Cowley
left 7-Eleven March 31, 2001 and June, 2002. By wrongfully withholding the password to the
computer disk containing the AMS accounts, however, defendants have concealed this fact, and
nothing about it can be claimed or shown.
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high". Mr. de Besche who was Ms. Atkin's boss for at least several months after the payments
began, testified that such an arrangement would have violated the 7-Eleven "Code of Business
Conduct", and been "very wrong". Mr. de Besche said he was unaware of this behavior at the time.
Plaintiffs discovered it only by examining the tardily produced accounts of QMS.
Of course, Mrs. Porter confirmed what was shouted to her by counsel: that the payments to
Atkin would not have been wrong if she had obtained permission from 7-Eleven. That, of course,
is not evidence that Ms. Atkin had such permission (which must be in writing), and in any case, such
permission, in the first instance, would have had to come from her boss, Mr. de Besche, who says he
knew nothing of such payments. Certainly Mr. de Besche, in June 2002, having decided with respect
to Mr. Cowley that 7-Eleven would not tolerate such behavior, would not have promptly authorized
it in Ms. Atkin.
Ms. Atkin did not appear because, short of asserting her rights under the Fifth Amendment,
she would have had to confess away her job.
The episode makes clear, however, at least the following:
1. The Porters never had any principled objection to what they have vilified throughout as
Mr. Cowley's misbehavior, and continued to engage in it with Ms. Atkin, while she and they
denounced it to 7-Eleven and the Court in Mr. Cowley.
2. Ms. Atkin's testimony by affidavit throughout this proceeding was compensated by the
Porters, without disclosure to plaintiffs or the Court.
3. The Porters' relationship with Ms. Atkin may be the ground for the alleged recent dismissal
of QMS by 7-Eleven, which the Porters have attempted to blame on Mr. Cowley in an effort to avoid
further obligation under even the contract they assert as a defense.
4. The central allegation of the defense - that the business for which Porters on June 22 and
24, 2002, agreed to pay $600,000, was vastly reduced in value by disclosure to Ann Atkin on June
23rd and 27th, 2002, of behavior she fundamentally disapproved, rendering doubtful the future of 7Eleven contracts to be "re-bid" thereafter - was knowingly false throughout. Atkin could not have
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disapproved behavior in which she promptly engaged, further, as Mr Cowley testified without
contradiction, as successor to Mr. Cowley's position, Atkm controlled the re-bidding process With
Atkin on its payroll, QMS was certain to get the contracts back
5 The Porters' assertion made to obtain the $240,000 agreement they claim was made July
19, 2002 - that QMS could afford no more than $4,000/month for five years - and any contract
resulting from it, was fraudulent The income inherited by QMS from AMS was then as secure as
it had ever been
The miserable tale of Ann Atkin, as much as the Porters' tawdry fabrications about drowned
tape recordings, demonstrates that the defense in this case has been in wholesale bad faith from the
outset

DURESS
Defendants literally claim that the alleged $240,000 contract to purchase plaintiffs' half of
AMS was procured by duress.
The Court has held that defendants violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing among
partners to gain advantage over plaintiffs by "confessing" alleged improprieties to 7-Eleven
Defendants assert that they then unilaterally reduced the amount due plaintiffs under "our buy-out
agreement" reached previously, upon the threat that, unless plaintiffs agreed, "no one would get
paid " Defendants knew that the threat was false, but did not inform plaintiffs
any wrongful act or threat, which actually puts the victim in such fear as to
compel him to act against his will constitutes duress
Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P 2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980)
Tracy Cowley's uncontradicted testimony was that Slone Porter threatened the Cowleys that
if they did not accept the Porters' terms, Porters could have 7-Eleven sue the Cowleys
Plaintiffs deny that they acceded to defendants' bullying, fraud and threats

Supposing,

however, that defendants' story was deemed credible, it is plain that any agreement obtained was
procured by duress and unenforceable

Bond v. SDNCO, Inc , 54 P 3d 1131, 1137-1138 (Utah
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2002); Strickland Tower Maintenance, Inc. v.AT& T Communications, Inc., 128 F. 3d 1422 (10 Cir.
1997).
As the Court has already held, defendants' behavior was wrongful, it violated a duty of good
faith and fair dealing. It was deceptive and fraudulent in failing to disclose Porters' control of Atkin.
It was coercive and threatening, because it asserted that Porters' improperly obtained leverage could
result in Cowleys' receiving nothing or being sued. If Cowleys agreed, Porters concede that it was
against their will, insofar as Slone Porter testifies that the Cowleys first "exploded". There could
hardly be a clearer case of duress and unenforceability.

RESCISSION
Plaintiffs believe that on June 24, 2002, they entered into an agreement to sell their half of
AMS to defendants for $600,000 payable over five years. Had that agreement been honestly
performed, plaintiffs would have accepted the payments, though they believe that the price was unfair.
Instead, they have been faced with outright breach of the agreement and denial of its existence, then
with a campaign of attrition, in the hope that refusal to concede the truth would produce sufficient
delay that the pittance defendants have paid (while munificently aggrandizing themselves) would
eventually starve any action against them.
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an
action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there has been
a material breach of the contract by the other party. What constitutes so serious a
breach as to justify rescission is not easily reduced to precise statement, but certainly
a failure of performance which "defeats the very object of the contract" or "[is] of
such prime importance that the contract would not have been made if default in that
particular had been contemplated" is a material failure.
Polyglycoat Corp-, v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) (citations omitted).
There can be no question that defendants' refusal to pay the price agreed was a material
breach, or that once the breach occurred, compliance was demanded and refused. Plaintiffs are
entitled to rescission.
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RELIEF
Defendants are simply thieves and liars Except with plaintiffs' consent, they are not entitled
to acquire, for $600,000 without interest, in monthly installments for five years, an interest which
their own income demonstrates was worth vastly more
The latter suggests a difficulty in formulating relief in this case Defendants have always
thought that so long as they could limit what plaintiffs received, they could stifle litigation against
them, and make themselves judgment proof They think so now they now claim a right to stop
paying defendants altogether, even on the $240,000 contract they assert The weapon of bad faith
and non-compliance should be taken out of defendants' hands at once
The best that defendants could do in this case was to limit what they owe to $240,000 Their
prospects in this regard were always virtually zero They may get by for $600,000, but proof of a
$600,000 agreement leads directly to a claim for rescission, as well as to a claim for bad faith defense,
and fees and costs under § 78-27-56, U C A (1953) It is possible that a valuation in a judicial
dissolution will show a value for plaintiffs' half interest as of June 22, 2002, of less than $600,000,
but it is extremely unlikely Within these parameters and unless plaintiffs now opt to re-affirm the
$600,000 agreement, the Court should fashion a remedy which cancels the advantages defendants
have arrogated to themselves
Defendants have paid plaintiffs $88,000 at $4,000/month Certainly, they must continue to
pay at least $4,000/month This amount is $6,000/month short of the $600,000 buy-out, creating a
present shortage of $132,000, even if the $600,000 buy-out were enforced If the latter sum were
ordered paid at once, the sum paid would not exceed the at least $240,000 admittedly owed
defendants would still owe five months at $4,000

Five months should suffice to complete a

valuation, whereupon a new order can be made for satisfaction of the debt This result could not
seriously discomfit defendants, even in the extraordinary unlikelihood of a successful appeal

A

further order for fees against defendants would be fully justified now, and might serve to caution
defendants against further delay
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Such an order - or a more generous one within the Court's discretion - is essential to prevent
defendants stifling the exercise of rights against them by determined misbehavior. The Court should
order that as prompt a hearing as possible be had to determine the value of a half interest in AMS as
of June 22, 2002, and that in the interim defendants promptly pay to plaintiffs at least the sum of
$132,000, while continuing to make monthly payments of $4,000/month. Such sums may be
appropriately deducted from the final award.

FEES
Section 78-27-56, U.C.A. (1953) provides:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
The Court has correctly found that, in attempting to expose plaintiffs to the anger of 7-Eleven
in order to force an acquisition of AMS on defendants' terms, defendants breached a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing between partners. In fact, defendants' behavior has been coercive and
deceitful throughout, entitling plaintiffs to their attorneys' fees under § 78-27-56.
The entirety of the defense in this case has been that, since AMS lost all its value on June 24,
2002, except the value of its "hard assets", the parties on July 19, 2002, made an agreement to sell
plaintiffs' half of AMS for $240,000, whereupon Slone Porter filed an Affidavit of Dissolution for
AMS, a corporation without stock or stockholders. Between June 22, 2002 and July 19, 2002,
defendants claimed, plaintiffs refused to agree to a $600,000 buy-out. Defendants and their counsel
have known at all pertinent times that the claim of such an agreement was not only false, but that its
enforcement was impossible.
Defendants now admit that on June 24, 2002, the parties at least orally agreed upon a
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$600,000 "buy-out", the terms of which are written and signed by Slone Porter. Tracy Cowley then
withheld signature of the document for a couple of days, but the reason was not rejection of the
terms, and the signature could have been obtained readily thereafter except that defendants, who had
the document, did not submit it for signature.
What happened in the interim to prevent it was that defendants believed they had obtained
leverage from 7-Eleven to coerce a cheaper deal. They excuse this upon the ground that "AMS has
been fired" by 7-Eleven. "Fired", however, is simply manipulative jargon to disguise the fact that 7Eleven had allowed defendants to continue the work of AMS for 7-Eleven, so long as they "reincorporated" as QMS following Mr. Cowley's agreement to leave. The new arrangement with 7Eleven on June 27th did not change in the least degree the benefits to defendants of their June 24th
bargain with plaintiffs. This is particularly true in light of the undisclosed fact that defendants had
then subverted Mr. Cowley's replacement at 7-Eleven, Ann Atkin, and shortly began making
payments to her through her family to assure that she controlled any 7-Eleven re-bidding process to
favor QMS.
On July 19th, defendants attempted to force plaintiffs to accept half the value of an informal
and incomplete appraisal of "hard assets" of AMS, less half the debt attached to equipment being kept
by Porters. When this attempt failed, defendants offered $4,000/month forfiveyears, as representing
what QMS "could afford". Defendants cannot explain the change of position.
Both parties then knew, however, that what QMS could afford would shortly be clarified, by
re-bidding of the 7-Eleven contracts and likely substantially increased. The $4,000/month figure was
temporary, subject to clarification. There is simply no reason why the parties would have based a
permanent agreement on a temporaryfigure,and no evidence that they did, except the word of Slone
Porter disputed by Tracy Cowley. There is no writing.
Even if there had been credible evidence of a long term agreement to accept $4,000/month,
Slone Porter admits that it was procured by the false representation that otherwise Cowleys might
get nothing, and no one denies that Porter threatened Cowley with legal action by 7-Eleven if he
15

didn't accede.
Porters have known from the outset that their claims of a permanent $4,000/month agreement
reached July 19, 2002, were false. Their counsel knew, and were required to advise them, that any
claimed oral agreement was vitiated by fraud and duress, and further, could not conceivably satisfy
the rules of partial performance under the Statute of Frauds. The existence of a prior agreement,
which would have to be admitted, rendered impossible any claim of performance "strictly referable"
to an unprovable, subsequent "agreement".
Defendants have always known that their defense could not survive the briefest examination.
They have withheld information (see Affidavit of Slone Porter Sept. 29, 2003), withheld discovery
(such as the passwords to computer disks produced tardily), destroyed evidence to head off
litigation, purchased the testimony of Ann Atkin, and lied (what else can be said, for example, of Mrs.
Porter's claim to have destroyed tape recordings on July 24, 2002, despite her prior admission that
they were destroyed before July 19th?). They knew they could only delay a day of reckoning by
withholding and obscuring the truth.
Through all of this, they used the Cowley's half of AMS to pay themselves twice what they
had ever earned before, while ceding the Cowleys less than half They left no stone unturned to
prolong this state of affairs, hoping that a war of attrition would succeed in avoiding liability.
Defendants have shattered the good faith requirement of § 78-27-56. They must be required
to pay plaintiffs' attorney fees.

VERALYNN PORTER IS A PROPER DEFENDANT
Plaintiffs respectfully assert that the Court has improvidently dismissed Veralynn Porter as
a defendant in this matter. While it is true that Mrs. Porter did not own stock in AMS, and would
not on that account have been a proper party plaintiff, she was clearly a proper party defendant.
It is also true that only Slone Porter signed the "Buy-Out Agreement" for Cowleys' half of
AMS. The evidence indicates, however, that the intent was that the two Porters take over the
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company, and pay for it. It is evidence of this intent that the negotiations to purchase were
dominated, on the part of the Porters, by Veralynn and that the vehicle into which Porters attempted
to transfer AMS, QMS, was owned fifty percent by Veralynn Porter.
Further, unless the Court orders specific performance of the signed "Buy-Out Agreement",
it is plain that the liability to pay Cowleys attaches to both the Porters.
To the extent that AMS remains undissolved, QMS is simply an empty corporate shell into
which the Porters attempted, unsuccessfully, to transfer AMS, and in which they improperly received
income of AMS. Absent an enforceable dissolution of AMS, QMS, is irrelevant.
There is literally no evidence that the Cowleys ever dealt with QMS. In making a bargain to
sell a share of AMS for $600,000 on June 24, 2002, Cowley dealt with the Porters. QMS did not
then exist. If that bargain fails for any reason, there exists no subsequent agreement. Any alleged
negotiations for a further agreement on July 19, 2002, in any case, were with Slone and Veralynn
Porter. Porters did not purport to act for QMS, but to finalize an agreement reached before there
was a QMS. While checks paying the Cowleys $4,000/month beginning August 2002, were drawn
on a QMS account (to SLS), the name on the account is irrelevant.
Cowleys having dealt only with the Porters, there is no need to question the status of QMS,
or to "pierce the corporate veil". It is fundamentally irrelevant into what form of entity the Porters
attempted to transfer what they purchased from the Cowleys. The purchase and dissolution of the
former entity had to occur before any such transfer.
On the other hand, it is plain that Veralynn Porter participated throughout in efforts to coerce
Cowleys to sell, and to deceive them about the circumstances in which Porters embroiled them. Mrs.
Porter first contacted Ann Atkin and met with her. Though Mrs. Cowley did not, Mrs. Porter met
with Johan de Besche, and by her own testimony, begged that "we" be permitted to continue the
work of AMS, and that 7-Eleven continue with "us" the relationship it had with AMS. It is with this
plea that de Besche agreed for 7-Eleven.
It was Mrs. Porter who destroyed the evidence.
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Plainly, Mrs. Porter acted in these matters on her own account, not as an employee or
assistant of Mr. Porter, and with the intent of receiving half the spoils for herself She admittedly did
receive and use half the spoils.
Those who participated directly in, and benefitted directly from, the wrongful dispossession
of a business, are proper defendants in an action to recoup the value of the business taken. Veralynn
Porter is a proper defendant in this action. The Court should vacate its ruling dismissing her.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 17th day of June, 2004.
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Jeffrey R.Price (6315)
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E. Craig Smay

19

